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2021/07: Ignorance is bliss: voter education and alignment in distributive politics

Central politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians’ allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However, drivers count one at a time: alignment matters before local elections, while local political accountability matters before central elections. We then perform a test of our model using Brazilian data, which corroborates our results. Furthermore, we show and explain why political accountability becomes a curse: better educated districts receive fewer transfers in equilibrium.

Favre de Noguera, Daniel

HYBRID SEMINAR – Gianluca Russo (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) – «War, Socialism and the Rise of Fascism: An Empirical Exploration»


ONLINE SEMINAR: Stefano Gagliarducci (University of Rome Tor Vergata) – «Faith and Assimilation: Italian Immigrants in the U.S.»

14.30h – ONLINE

ONLINE SEMINAR: Andrea Tesei (Queen Mary University) – «Mobile Phones and the Rise of Political Tribalism in Europe»

14.30h – ONLINE

Castells Oliveres, Antoni

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