In a two-country model, the citizens of a ‘big home country’ can either fictitiously move residence to a ‘small foreign country’ where residence-based taxes are lower (external tax avoidance), or under-report the tax base at home (internal tax avoidance). Tax setting is the result of Cournot-Nash competition between revenue maximizing governments, with the home government also setting two types of administration policies, one for each form of tax avoidance. We show that although it is optimal to employ both types of administration policies, which in themselves are both effective at tackling the targeted form of tax avoidance, the optimum is characterized by a tradeoff in terms of policy outcomes: either internal avoidance increases and external avoidance decreases, or the opposite, depending on the characteristics of the fiscal environment.

Even though place-based policies involve large transfers toward low-income neighborhoods, they may also produce territorial stigmatization. This paper appeals to the quasi-experimental discontinuity in a French reform that redrew the zoning map of subsidized neighborhoods on the basis of a sharp poverty cut-off to assess the effect of place-based policies on school enrollment into lower secondary education. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find strong evidence of stigma from policy designation, as public middle schools in neighbourhoods below the policy cut-off, which qualified for place-based subsidies, saw a significant 3.5pp post-reform drop in pupil enrollment, compared to their counterfactual analogues in unlabeled areas lying just above the poverty threshold. This «zone-and-shame» effect is immediate but does not persist, as it is only found for the first pupil-entry cohort in middle schools immediately after the reform. We show that it was triggered by the behavioral reactions of parents from all socioeconomic backgrounds, who avoided public schools in policy areas and shifted to those in other areas or, only for richer parents, to private schools. We uncover, on the contrary, only weak evidence of stigma reversion after an area loses its designation, suggesting hysteresis in bad reputations.

Immigrant inflows affect local house prices by increasing housing demand when housing supply is fixed. In this paper, I show that we can formally decompose total demand changes into changes stemming from an immediate increase in population due to new arrivals (“partial effect”) and additional changes in demand from relocated natives (“induced effect”). I propose a methodology to separately estimate these two effects using Spanish provinces’ data from 2001- 2012. Applying an instrumental variables approach, I find that a 1 p.p. increase in the immigration rate increases average house prices by 3.3% and rents by 1%. Partial demand estimates are 24% smaller than the total estimates, due to immigrants and natives locating in the same provinces. The results show that accounting for the impact of immigration on native location choices is key to understanding net demand adjustments, as partial and total effects can significantly differ depending on native population mobility.

March 21, 2023 – Room 1038 – 14.30h

March 16, 2023 – Seminar Room 3 ERE – 14.35h

March 14, 2023 – Room 1038 – 14.35h