“Jumping without Parachutes. Revolving Doors and Political Incentive” is the title of the project proposed by Matteo Gamalerio, recently awarded a grant by the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF). The IEB researcher is the co-author of the document along with Federico Trombetta of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan, Italy). The prize, which is shared with four other studies, is awarded each year to high-quality, policy-relevant projects in Italy.

Matteo Gamalerio’s research aims to study whether ‘anti-revolving door’ policies affect politicians’ careers and performance. The proposal is to make use of data from Italian municipalities and to take advantage of the implementation of an ‘anti-revolving door’ policy that is applied in municipalities in that country with more than 15,000 inhabitants. According to this policy, local politicians cannot be appointed as directors of publicly owned companies or to the highest positions in the administration during the period they are in office or in the year after their departure from political office.

The authors of the study intend to analyse whether the policy has changed the professional path of local politicians, their performance in office, and the calibre of the people who enter politics.