en

IEB

2025/02: The role of the carrot and stick in tax compliance in a decentralised context

We analyse whether decentralisation affects tax morale through both greater trust in institutions (the carrot) and greater perceived tax enforcement (the stick), two drivers of compliance that operate via the promotion of voluntary compliance and deterrence, respectively. We take advantage of the Spanish case characterised by a general regime, which is partially decentralised, and the so-called foral regime, operated in two regions, which is fully decentralised (i.e. high tax regulatory and administrative powers). We draw on data from a unique survey that are representative both of the national level and of the foral regions. Under the foral regime, the average citizen neither presents a higher level of tax morale, nor has the perception of a higher level of enforcement. Thus, any structuring of the tax administration within a federal system cannot be based on what are presumed to be higher levels of compliance resulting from the decentralisation of the administration.

FORO FISCAL IEB 1.2: El impuesto sobre sucesiones: redistribución y empresa familiar

19h – 20.45h – Cercle d’Economia

Secomandi, Riccardo

WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION

June 3-4, 2025

IEB Report 2/2024: Competitiveness of the Economy and the Fiscal System

In a globalized world, business competitiveness is particularly important; within it, taxes can play a key role. When can a tax system be considered competitive? One easy and immediate answer has to do with the level of taxation: a low tax burden compared with other countries would ensure a competitive tax system. But the issue is somewhat more complex. First, economic development also requires quality public services and infrastructure, which can hardly be provided without funding. Second, the tax structure also matters, i.e. the weight of the various taxes, as well as each one’s specific design, in which the nominal tax rate is an important factor. Indeed, along with other legal aspects, it is what ultimately determines the effective tax rate, which can condition the establishment of companies or attraction of foreign direct investment. And third, in addition to the direct tax burden, there are also compliance costs1, which are in part related to how many levels of government have regulatory powers.

SEMINAR: Mazhar Waseem (University of Manchester) – “Intended and Unintended Consequences of Anti-Avoidance Rules: Evidence from Uganda”

December 10, 2024 – 14.30h – Room 1038