This paper aims at studying the scope of agglomerations economies empirically. In particular, two issues are explored. First, the industrial scope of agglomeration economies is analysed, by comparing the effects arising from co-localization of same industry firms (localization economies) to the benefits derived from large and diversified economic environments (urbanization/Jacobs diversity effects). Second, the geographic scope of these external effects is studied. These issues are addressed by studying the effects of local industrial characteristics on the one number of births of new establishments in the subsequent period. A theoretical framework is used to interpret regression results in terms of scale effects (productivity shifters). Econometric estimations are carried out, separately, for seven industries for Catalonia, which is a Spanish region, using 1997-2000 data. Evidence of localization, urbanization and diversity effects has been found. Agglomeration economies seem to work at a very local level.

The paper presents a framework for measuring spillovers resulting from local expenditure policies. We identify and test for two different types of expenditure spillovers: (i) “benefit spillovers”, arising from the provision of local public goods, and (ii) “crowding spillovers”, arising from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. Benefit spillovers are accounted for by assuming that the representative resident enjoys the consumption of a local public good in both his own community and in those surrounding it. Crowding spillovers are included by considering that a locality’s consumption level is influenced by the population living in the surrounding localities. We estimate a reaction function, with interactions between local governments occurring not only between expenditure levels, but also between neighbors’ populations and expenditures. The equation is estimated using data on more than 2,500 Spanish local governments for the year 1999. The results show that both types of spillovers are relevant.

This paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition, measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election (i.e. the difference between the vote share and 50%). Two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper. On the one hand, the Leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is, the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector, irrespective of the ideology of the party in power. On the other hand, the Partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low (i.e., parties on the left/right will increase/decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low). These hypotheses are tested with information on spending, own revenues and deficit for more than 500 Spanish local governments over 8 years (1992-1999), and information on the results of two local electoral contests (1991 and 1995). The evidence favors the Partisan hypothesis over the Leviathan one.

We test the ‘yardstick competition’ hypothesis by looking at the effects of property tax increases both in the locality and in other comparable jurisdictions on the incumbents’ vote. In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of taxes on voting, we account for national political shocks, ideological preferences of the citizenship and government traits, and we estimate the vote equation using instrumental variables. We also allow various traits of the government (ideology, coalition government, and first term government) to mediate the effects of taxes on voting. The vote equation was estimated using a large database containing nearly 3,000 Spanish municipalities and analysing three local elections (1995, 1999 and 2003). The results suggest that property tax increases, both at municipality and neighbourhood level, have a non-negligible impact on incumbent votes, and that this impact is especially high when: the government is right-wing, is a coalition, and is not in its first term.

This paper looks for empirical evidence on spillovers occurring between central cities and their suburbs, both on the fiscal side and on the growth of population and output. To test these hypotheses we specify a dynamic model with population and output both in the central city and in the suburbs as endogenous variables and with fiscal variables in the central city and in the suburbs as covariates. The model is estimated with a panel of data of twenty-eight metropolitan areas in Spain for the period 1992-2001.The main findings are that the capital stock in the central city promotes growth both in the city and in the suburbs. Also, higher growth in the central city translates into higher long run growth in the suburbs. These results are indicative of the potential welfare gains of both, concentrating financial resources in the central city, and of the implementation of existing proposals of metropolitan consolidation.

The aim of this study is to estimate the redistributive, stabiliser and insurance effects at territorial level of the federal budget of Australia, Spain, the USA and of the European Union. This analysis is carried out for the budget as a whole through regional fiscal balances and, separately for the revenues and expenditures. The methodology used is a panel data econometric model. The main conclusion is that in all the cases considered the expenditures have higher effects, both redistributive and stabiliser/insurance, than the revenues and that the size of the European budget should increase in order to be able to develope redistributive policies.