

Matteo Gamalerio

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Current position

2018 - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB, Universitat de Barcelona), Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Education

2017 PhD in Economics
University of Warwick
Advisors: Ben Lockwood, Mirko Draca
Thesis: "Rules, discretion and quality of government: evidence from Italian municipalities"
Committee: James Fenske, Andrea Tesei

2012 MSc in Economics (research)
London School of Economics and Political Science

2010 MSc in Economics
Catholic University of Milan, Italy

2007 B.Sc. in Economics and Management of Arts and Entertainment
Catholic University of Milan, Italy

2006 Erasmus Exchange program
University of Valladolid, Spain

References

[Ben Lockwood](#)

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University of Warwick
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[Mirko Draca](#)

Department of Economics
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[Fernanda Brollo](#)

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[Jeremy Smith](#)

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University of Warwick
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Research Interests

Applied Econometrics, Political Economy, Public Economics, Economics of Migration.

Affiliations

Political Economy and Public Economics Warwick research group.

Working papers

M. Gamalerio (September 2017). “Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees” CESifo working paper no. 7212 SUBMITTED

M. Gamalerio (June, 2017). “Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities” *Winner of the EEA Young Economist Award at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the European Economic Association*

M. Gamalerio (June, 2017). “Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities”

M. Bordignon, M. Gamalerio, G. Turati (July, 2017). “Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection” SUBMITTED

Teaching Experience

2017-2018	Econometrics 2 - EC338, micro-econometrics, Lecturer University of Warwick, Department of Economics
2017-2018	Econometrics - EC9760, Teaching Assistant Warwick Business School
2017-2018	EC9A3 – Advanced Econometric Theory (PhD) University of Warwick, Department of Economics
2015-2018	Econometrics 1 - EC226, Senior Tutor University of Warwick, Department of Economics
2016-2017	Introduction to statistics and Stata, Teaching Assistant Warwick Business School
2015-2017	Econometrics A - EC902/EC907 (MSc), Teaching Assistant University of Warwick, Department of Economics
2014-2016	Econometrics, Teaching Assistant Warwick Economics Summer School
2013-2015	Econometrics 1 - EC226, Teaching Assistant University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Research Experience and Other Employment

- 2016-2017 Research Assistant, Fernanda Brollo and Mirko Draca
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2015 Research Assistant, Fernanda Brollo and Juan Carlos Gozzi
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2015 Research Assistant, Thiemo Fetzer
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2014-2015 Research Assistant, Mirko Draca
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2010-2011 Research Assistant, Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati
Catholic University of Milan, Department of Economics

Referee

American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Canadian Journal of Economics, European Journal of Political Economy, International Tax and Public Finance, Economics Bulletin

Seminars Presentations and Conferences

- 2018 *Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees*
IEB (Universitat de Barcelona), Royal Economic Society Conference; ZEW Public Finance Conference, Kiel Institute, 4th Workshop on the Economics of Migration (IAB), Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, IX IBEO Workshop-Alghero;
- 2017 *Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees*
CReAM/RWI Workshop on the economics of migration; Petralia Workshop (Job market boot camp); Advances in Political Economy and Public Economics Workshop, Max Planck Institute (Scheduled); 11th Workshop on Political Economy, Ifo Institute (Scheduled); European Winter Meeting – Econometric Society (Scheduled); 42nd SAEe meeting (Scheduled); RES PhD meeting (Scheduled);
- Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities*
Royal Economic Society Conference; RES Symposium of Junior Researchers; Warwick PhD Conference; Warwick Public Economics/Political Economy workshop; EEA- ESEM;
- 2016 *Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities*
Royal Economic Society Conference; First Marco Fanno Alumni Workshop, Unicredit, Milan; Evidence-Based Economics Summer Meeting, Universities of Munich, Erlangen-Nuremberg and Regensburg;
- Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection*
EEA-ESEM;

- 2015 *Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities*
Conference of Italian Public Economics Society (SIEP);

Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection
VI Alghero Workshop on “Institutions, Individual Behaviour and Economic Outcomes”;
- 2014 *Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection*
Canadian Public Economics Group; Political Economy Workshop, Catholic University of Milan;

Awards and Extra Curricular Achievements

- 2017 Paper “Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities”
Winner of the EEA Young Economist Award, EEA-ESEM 2017, Lisbon
Awarded by Unicredit & Universities Foundation
- 2012 ESRC DTC scholarship for 3 years of full-time study.
Awarded by the Graduate School of the University of Warwick
- 2010 “Marco Fanno” scholarship for graduate studies in economics, academic year 2011-2012.
Awarded by Unicredit & Universities Foundation
- 2010 Toefl certificate (Internet based test, final mark 101)
- 2010 GRE (Graduate Record Examination): quantitative 780/800
- 2008 Working Experience Abroad, Catholic University of Melbourne (Australia)
- 2007 Dele certificate (Diploma de Español como lengua extranjera, intermediate level, 95/100)

Skills

Languages: Italian (native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent)
Computer: Stata, Excel, Latex, Scientific Workplace, Word

Research papers – Abstracts

“Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees” CESifo working paper no. 7212 SUBMITTED

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? I study this question in the setting of Italian municipalities making decisions about the reception of refugees. The localized control of the reception policy (SPRAR), combined with the exogenous timing of policy decisions and staggered elections, enables me to study the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees. Although municipalities receive fiscal grants for hosting refugees, electoral incentives reduce the probability of opening a refugee centre by 24 per cent. The effect is driven by voters' misperceptions of immigrants and by extreme-right political preferences. The results explain why is difficult to reach an equal redistribution of refugees across and within countries.

“Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities” *Winner of the EEA Young Economist Award at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the European Economic Association*

Many countries have recently introduced fiscal rules to constrain governments' fiscal policies and action. Despite the wide adoption, there is little evidence on the consequences of fiscal rules for the quality of government. I use data from Italian municipalities to study how fiscal rules affect the selection of politicians. In 1999, the Italian government applied fiscal rules to all municipalities, and in 2001 it removed them for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. Using a Difference-in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-Disc) design, which enables control for an institutionally mandated increase in the wage paid to politicians at the 5000-inhabitant threshold, I provide the following empirical evidence: 1) fiscal rules negatively affect the quality of politicians, and in particular their level of education; 2) consistent with the idea that competent individuals enter politics if they are given enough discretion, the effect is driven by municipalities with low deficits; 3) fiscal rules offset the positive effect of the wage increase on the selection of politicians.

“Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities”

Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. Civic Lists in Italy). I exploit the success of Civic Lists in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. In particular, using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides that, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Finally, the results are not driven by political orientation, alignment with the central government, the presence of criminal organizations nor by unobserved political ability.

“Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection” (with M. Bordignon and G. Turati) SUBMITTED

In a model of politics with different types of politicians, following a tax decentralization reform, politicians with high administrative skills are elected in rich municipalities and politicians with high political skills are elected in poor municipalities. As a result, voter welfare increases only, or mainly, in rich municipalities. These results provide a different rationale for the observed poor performance of local governments largely financed by grants. We test these predictions by exploiting the decentralization reforms in Italy in the 90's. These reforms introduced the direct election of the mayor and new autonomous tax tools, that affected differently rich and poor municipalities because of the differences in their tax bases. Results support our predictions and are robust to several alternative stories.