

Matteo Gamalerio

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Current position

2018 - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB, Universitat de Barcelona), Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Education

2017 PhD in Economics
University of Warwick
Advisors: Ben Lockwood, Mirko Draca
Thesis: "Rules, discretion and quality of government: evidence from Italian municipalities"
Committee: James Fenske, Andrea Tesei

2012 MSc in Economics (research)
London School of Economics and Political Science

2010 MSc in Economics
Catholic University of Milan, Italy

2007 B.Sc. in Economics and Management of Arts and Entertainment
Catholic University of Milan, Italy

2006 Erasmus Exchange program
University of Valladolid, Spain

References

[Ben Lockwood](#)

Department of Economics
University of Warwick
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[Mirko Draca](#)

Department of Economics
University of Warwick
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[Jeremy Smith](#)

Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Jeremy.Smith@warwick.ac.uk
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Research Interests

Applied Econometrics, Political Economy, Public Economics, Economics of Migration.

Affiliations

Political Economy and Public Economics Warwick research group.

Working papers

M. Gamalerio, M. Luca and M. Viskanic (November 2018). “Finding the Warmth of other Suns? Refugee Reception, Extreme Votes and Hate Crimes”

M. Gamalerio (September 2018). “Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees” CESifo working paper no. 7212

M. Bordignon, M. Gamalerio, G. Turati (September 2018). “Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection” SUBMITTED

M. Gamalerio (June 2017). “Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities” *Winner of the EEA Young Economist Award at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the European Economic Association*

M. Gamalerio (June 2017). “Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities”

Teaching Experience

2017-2018 Econometrics 2 - EC338, micro-econometrics, Lecturer
University of Warwick, Department of Economics

2017-2018 Econometrics - EC9760, Teaching Assistant
Warwick Business School

2017-2018 EC9A3 – Advanced Econometric Theory (PhD)
University of Warwick, Department of Economics

2015-2018 Econometrics 1 - EC226, Senior Tutor
University of Warwick, Department of Economics

2016-2017 Introduction to statistics and Stata, Teaching Assistant
Warwick Business School

2015-2017 Econometrics A - EC902/EC907 (MSc), Teaching Assistant
University of Warwick, Department of Economics

2014-2016 Econometrics, Teaching Assistant
Warwick Economics Summer School

2013-2015 Econometrics 1 - EC226, Teaching Assistant
University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Research Experience and Other Employment

2016-2017 Research Assistant, Fernanda Brollo and Mirko Draca
University of Warwick, Department of Economics

- 2015 Research Assistant, Fernanda Brollo and Juan Carlos Gozzi
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2015 Research Assistant, Thiemo Fetzer
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2014-2015 Research Assistant, Mirko Draca
University of Warwick, Department of Economics
- 2010-2011 Research Assistant, Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati
Catholic University of Milan, Department of Economics

Referee

American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Canadian Journal of Economics, European Journal of Political Economy, International Tax and Public Finance, Economics Bulletin

Seminars Presentations and Conferences

- 2018 *Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees*
IEB (Universitat de Barcelona), Royal Economic Society Conference; ZEW Public Finance Conference, Kiel Institute, 4th Workshop on the Economics of Migration (IAB), Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, IX IBEO Workshop-Alghero;
- Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities*
Joint Research Centre, Ispra (Italy); Universita' della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano (Switzerland);
- 2017 *Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees*
CReAM/RWI Workshop on the economics of migration; Petralia Workshop (Job market boot camp); Advances in Political Economy and Public Economics Workshop, Max Planck Institute (Scheduled); 11th Workshop on Political Economy, Ifo Institute (Scheduled); European Winter Meeting – Econometric Society (Scheduled); 42nd SAEe meeting (Scheduled); RES PhD meeting (Scheduled);
- Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities*
Royal Economic Society Conference; RES Symposium of Junior Researchers; Warwick PhD Conference; Warwick Public Economics/Political Economy workshop; EEA- ESEM;
- 2016 *Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities*
Royal Economic Society Conference; First Marco Fanno Alumni Workshop, Unicredit, Milan; Evidence-Based Economics Summer Meeting, Universities of Munich, Erlangen-Nuremberg and Regensburg;
- Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection*
EEA-ESEM;
- 2015 *Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities*
Conference of Italian Public Economics Society (SIEP);

Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection
VI Alghero Workshop on “Institutions, Individual Behaviour and Economic Outcomes”;

2014 *Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection*
Canadian Public Economics Group; Political Economy Workshop, Catholic University of Milan;

Awards and Extra Curricular Achievements

2017 Paper “Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities”
Winner of the EEA Young Economist Award, EEA-ESEM 2017, Lisbon
Awarded by Unicredit & Universities Foundation

2012 ESRC DTC scholarship for 3 years of full-time study.
Awarded by the Graduate School of the University of Warwick

2010 “Marco Fanno” scholarship for graduate studies in economics, academic year 2011-2012.
Awarded by Unicredit & Universities Foundation

2010 Toefl certificate (Internet based test, final mark 101)

2010 GRE (Graduate Record Examination): quantitative 780/800

2008 Working Experience Abroad, Catholic University of Melbourne (Australia)

2007 Dele certificate (Diploma de Español como lengua extranjera, intermediate level, 95/100)

Skills

Languages: Italian (native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent)

Computer: Stata, Excel, Latex, Scientific Workplace, Word

Research papers – Abstracts

“Finding the Warmth of other Suns? Refugee Reception, Extreme Votes and Hate Crimes”

Does refugee reception lead to more hate crimes against foreigners? What is the impact of refugee reception on extreme-right voting and which role does the media play in the transmission? Using data on Italian SPRAR refugee centres we show that the reception of refugees across Italian municipalities leads to a decrease in extreme-right voting and hate crimes against foreigners. We analyse which role media coverage can play in the transmission. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that for the average assignment of 15 refugees per municipality the growth in vote shares for the extreme-right parties is decreased by 12.5 percentage points, which amounts to 2.25 percentage points looking at differences in vote shares. We also find that the hosting of 50 refugees leads to a reduction of about one hate crime over the period between 2013 and 2017. The effect on extreme voting is mainly driven by municipalities where local newspapers are less biased against migrants, where sport newspapers distribution is lower and where the local population has lower misperceptions of the presence of migrants.

“Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees” CESifo working paper no. 7212

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? I study this question in the setting of Italian municipalities making decisions about the reception of refugees. The localized control of the reception policy (SPRAR), combined with the exogenous timing of policy decisions and staggered elections, enables me to study the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees. Although municipalities receive fiscal grants for hosting refugees, electoral incentives reduce the probability of opening a refugee centre by 24 per cent. The effect is driven by voters' misperceptions of immigrants and by extreme-right political preferences. The results explain why is difficult to reach an equal redistribution of refugees across and within countries.

“Manager or politician? The effect of local fiscal autonomy on political selection” (with M. Bordignon and G. Turati) SUBMITTED

In a model of politics with different types of politicians, following a tax decentralization reform, politicians with high administrative skills are elected in rich municipalities and politicians with high political skills are elected in poor municipalities. As a result, voter welfare increases only, or mainly, in rich municipalities. These results provide a different rationale for the observed poor performance of local governments largely financed by grants. We test these predictions by exploiting the decentralization reforms in Italy in the 90's. These reforms introduced the direct election of the mayor and new autonomous tax tools, that affected differently rich and poor municipalities because of the differences in their tax bases. Results support our predictions and are robust to several alternative stories.

“Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from Italian municipalities” *Winner of the EEA Young Economist Award at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the European Economic Association*

Many countries have recently introduced fiscal rules to constrain governments' fiscal policies and action. Despite the wide adoption, there is little evidence on the consequences of fiscal rules for the quality of government. I use data from Italian municipalities to study how fiscal rules affect the selection of politicians. In 1999, the Italian government applied fiscal rules to all municipalities, and in 2001 it removed them for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. Using a Difference-in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-Disc) design, which enables control for an institutionally mandated increase in the wage paid to politicians at the 5000-inhabitant threshold, I provide the following empirical evidence: 1) fiscal rules negatively affect the quality of politicians, and in particular their level of education; 2) consistent with the idea that competent individuals enter politics if they are given enough discretion, the effect is driven by municipalities with low deficits; 3) fiscal rules offset the positive effect of the wage increase on the selection of politicians.

“Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities”

Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. Civic Lists in Italy). I exploit the success of Civic Lists in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. In particular, using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides that, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Finally, the results are not driven by political orientation, alignment with the central government, the presence of criminal organizations nor by unobserved political ability.